CAMILLE BARRÈRE and The Conduct of French Diplomacy
in Italy, 1898-1902
French foreign policy as practiced during the tenure of Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé was the most active and successful policy of any of the Great Powers. With an audacity and determination unknown since the era of German dominance a decade earlier, France under Delcassé contributed significantly to the “diplomatic revolution”1 which undermined the balance of power created by Otto von Bismarck in the 1880s and divided Europe into rival three-power alignments which would war against each other between 1914 and 1918. The noted Austrian historian, Alfred Francis Pribram, pinpointed the achievement of French diplomacy in this period when he wrote that “France…initiated all the agreements by which Germany was isolated and which resulted in that situation known in Germany as the Einkreisung or encirclement."2
When one compares France's international position in 1898 with her position in 1905, the importance of this period for the nation is readily perceived. In 1898 France
practically was isolated. A Franco-Russian Alliance existed in theory, but in practice the French could expect little more than diplomatic support from the Tsarist Empire.3 In colonial matters the primary French rival was Great Britain. But with a weaker navy than England, France could not hope to impose its will whenever its colonial efforts faced British opposition. On the continent, France was also weak, as the preponderance of the alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy rendered French ambitions within Europe unattainable.
By 1905, however, the situation had changed radically. The Franco-Russian Alliance had broadened in scope, and new military plans for co-ordination between the General Staffs of the two nations gave the arrangement an offensive strength unforeseen in the original treaty.4 With the conclusion of the entente cordiale in 1904, much of the Anglo-French colonial rivalry was resolved; by the time Delcassé left office, this rapprochement was rapidly becoming an alliance.5
Furthermore, because of a carefully-nurtured understanding between France and Italy, the Triple Alliance had been reduced in effect to its Austro-German core. When one adds to this situation French success at reconciling Russia and England and forging important agreements with several smaller European nations, one can appreciate Kaiser Wilhelm's exasperated comment following the Algeciras Conference in 1906: "A nice outlook! We must bargain in the future with the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Anglo-French entente, and an Anglo-Russian entente, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal as secondary satellites."6
Interpretative works on this period of French history tend to credit Delcassé with the accomplishments of French diplomacy. One biographer lauds him for having “fixed his policies clearly in his own mind” before coming to the foreign ministry so that once in office, "he was able to make his personal program become the national policy of
France.”7 To another historian, Delcassé’s achievements helped "to change foes into friends," thus leaving France "incomparably stronger."8 A memorist familiar with the foreign minister claims that Delcassée “was the greatest statesman of the Third Republic.”9
Although historians have not agreed upon Delcassé's main diplomatic goal—be it rapprochement with England,10 the acquisition of Morocco,11 a combination of both,12 or development of an anti-German power bloc to facilitate revanchist aspirations13—their general conclusions seem in harmony with the beliefs of his biographer who wrote:
At the beginning of the twentieth century there were few less predictable
European alignments than a Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia. Delcassé’s share in bringing about this improbable entente was probably
greater than that of any other European statesman.14
This study began as an attempt to assess the role of Delcassé in the implementation of French foreign policy during his seven-year tenure. By intensive research in unpublished documentary sources, including the Delcassé papers in Paris, I intended to assess the foreign minister’s policy toward one country, Italy, hopefully to shed light on the more general subject of his remarkable diplomatic accomplishments in the period 1898-1905. My research, however, has caused a decisive shift in my purpose.
I am now of the opinion that French diplomatic achievements in Italy were not the work of the foreign minister, but rather of the ambassador, Camille Barrère. Unlike Delcassé, by 1898 Barrère was a diplomat of considerable experience. Well before that date, from appointments in Egypt, Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland he had elaborated clear and extensive ideas on how French diplomacy should be conducted toward Italy.
Moreover, once he was appointed to Rome, Barrère labored singlemindedly at that post for twenty-six years to achieve and maintain Franco-Italian cooperation. From his post at the Farnese Palace, the French embassy in Rome, Barrère operated during Delcassé’s tenure with a minimum of direction from Paris. Aware of what he hoped to accomplish in Italy, Barrère was more than the representative of France; he was the creator of French diplomatic policy toward Italy.
The freedom of action enjoyed by the ambassador can be partly explained by his personal friendship with Delcassé. Because of their closeness for twenty years, Barrère was able to exact strong and loyal support for his ideas and undertakings.
Many times during the period under study, Barrère advised the foreign minister forcefully that the success of French policy depended upon the enactment in Paris of a particular line of conduct. Delcassé usually approved Barrère’s recommendations. The ambassador urged the foreign minister to make diplomatic policy in Paris compatible with his own goals in Rome. Occasionally, Barrère chided Delcassé for his laxity; he criticized the conservatism of the permanent Quai d’Orsay bureaucrats; and he pushed relentlessly for the realization of his policy goal. It was Barrère, moreover, who suggested the co-ordination of his efforts with those of other French ambassadors so that gains in Italy might be made part of a broader approach to refashioning France’s position in the European balance of power.
The most important factor explaining Barrère’s leeway, however, was his personality. Knowledgeable, patriotic, seductive, sensitive, clever, experienced and determined, the ambassador acted with an irrepressible flair and spirited resiliency which made him an author of policy rather than a simple recipient of instructions.
Reacting to the challenge of his post with almost the spirit of a sportsman, Barrère gained his diplomatic victories within a hostile milieu. Foreign representatives, Francophobe Italian statesmen, and Vatican leaders all resisted the creation of an entente between republican France and monarchial Italy.
Barrère was cognizant of the international antagonism toward his action, but he appears to have conceived of it as a challenge to his diplomatic skills. He displayed his competitive character, for instance, when he expressed personal satisfaction with completion of the Mediterranean Accord of 1900. Barrère wrote proudly to Delcassé that “The Italian business is by far the foremost one of your Ministry. You will see how it bears out. It does not answer the purposes of the English, the Germans, the Austrians—nor the Pope! For I have had the rare fortune in this campaign of having everyone against me.”15
There were instances, however, when Barrère’s desires were received unfavorably in Paris. In such cases, however, the ambassador maintained his indomitable spirit and sought new ways of accomplishing desired ends. Furthermore, Barrère exploited his attractive reputation as a man of great culture and achievement, a kind of Renaissance man. As early 1894 the well-respected political journalist Henri de Blowitz recognized that this up-and-coming young diplomat “has displayed in his rapid career a distinguished intelligence which has attracted the attention of all the diplomatists whose colleague this former member of the Commune became.”16 Barrère was an avid hunter, and a connaisseur of art and literature especially attracted to Shakespeare and Dickens. As well as being a respected journalist, while in London he wrote theater criticism for prominent magazines on topics as varied as the actor “Frederick Lemaitre” and “Victor Hugo’s Dramas.”17 Barrère was fluent in several languages, and he was a talented equestrian.
He was also a musician. In his private life in Rome he was an accomplished violinist who favored performing with string trios and quartets while in Rome. One writer called him "a master of the art. He is among the most gifted amateurs in Europe."18 He enjoyed playing with the young French musicians who had won prestigeous Prix de Rome scholarships and were now studying at the Villa Medici. Barrère also collected rare violins. His collection included an Amati, a Guarneri del Gesù from 1743, and a Stradivarius from 1727, the model still known today as the “Barrère” Stradivarius. While serving in Berne he had an instrument crafted especially for him by the Lyonnais violin-maker Elophe Poirson. He was widely considered to be an expert student of the instrument and wrote the introduction for the French edition in 1907 of W. Henry Hill’s definitive biography of the Italian violin-maker Antonio Stradivarius.19
Barrère was a man of traditional feelings about family. In the 1870s he had proposed marriage to the daughter of an Armenian banker from Constantinople. But he was rejected by her father: the would-be son-in-law was only a journalist with little hope for a fortune or a future. Seven years later, Barrère was now a wealthy and accomplished diplomat while his potential father-in-law had experienced setbacks in his banking career. A second proposal of marriage was accepted. Quickly the young diplomat found himself responsible for the fate of his wife’s family, helping to marry-off her sisters and financing the education of his brothers-in-law.20
Further, Barrère possessed an elegant and charming personality which attracted an entourage of major and minor Italian leaders.21 An embassy secretary has described the "natural authority" which the ambassador commanded in Rome:
Of tall and slender stature, marked by a full distinction of nobility,
with his handsome and energetic face which framed a light brown
beard à la Henri IV, he gave the impression of a will which did not
exclude suppleness; and his features occasionally would show
themselves with a singular softness. Exposing a great education,
varied conversation captivated his interlocuters and introduced in the
midst of arduous bargainings a propitious relaxation. His natural
authority assured him a veritable ascendence over those who negotiated
As my research has led me to a great appreciation of Barrère and his actions, it also has diminished my assessment of Delcassé's significance in the implementation of his policy. Although he is customarily praised as a successful foreign minister, Delcassé was neither a diplomatic genius like Bismarck, nor a skilled statesman like Salisbury. On the contrary, Delcassé' was a narrowly-focused parliamentary politician who was the captive of two foreign policy ideas to which he subordinated all other policies: the expansion of the French empire through the acquisition of Morocco,23 and the fundamental importance of the Franco-Russian Alliance to France’s international posture. Both of these proclivities, moreover, were costly. With his Moroccan policy, Delcassé lost his ministerial post and almost sparked a European war in 1905. With his Russian policy, he linked the financial, military, and diplomatic future of France with an archaic empire whose utter weakness by 1904 was dramatically evident in the Russo-Japanese War and its rebellious aftermath.
Delcassé at the Quay d’Orsay was not without importance. His significance,
however, lies not in his prescience or abilities as a great leader, but in the fact that he maintained his office for seven years, that he permitted a great deal of flexibility among some of his very able and trusted ambassadors, and that he acted as the coordinator rather than the inspiring leader of his subordinates’ talents.
In a letter written in 1901, Paul Cambon lamented that diplomatic history is only a long recitation of attempts by agents to do something and of "resistance from Paris." Cambon’s suggested remedy was a foreign minister who could maintain his office for a long time and have good personnel to work with him.24 Although Cambon could not read the future, Delcassé would remain at the Quai d'Orsay longer than any minister of foreign affairs in the history of the Third Republic.25
Through his diplomatic skill as ambassador to England for twenty-one years, Cambon would be a part of the "team without rivals,” that "moral alliance, a sort of triumvirate charged with our foreign interests”26—this being the combination of Paul Cambon in London; his brother Jules Cambon as ambassador to the United States, then Spain and finally Germany; and Camille Barrère.
Baron Alois Lexa von Aehrehthal, who was foreign minister of Austria in 1906-1912, said of this formidable ensemble, "The two Cambon brothers and Barrère, there is a trio of diplomats against which no country can put forward anything superior."27 The nature of this group and its relationship with Delcassé was best described by Charles de Chambrun:
In truth the new combinations attempted by Delcassé were more the
conscious work of French diplomacy than the personal impulse of
the minister's cabinet. Three great ambassadors whose characters had
the force of reason—Camille Barrère, Paul and Jules Cambon—formed
a moral alliance, a sort of triumvirate charged with our foreign interests.
There are three types of men: those who are at the disposition
of events, those who dispose them, and those who conduct them. The
latter impose themselves upon the people and leave their names in
history's golden book. The ambassadors whom I have mentioned shared
a will to action, political sagacity, and reflective seduction, a commonness
of thought united them; the same doctrine supported them. Their action
was reciprocal in the domain of diplomatic calculation, Enlightened by
their sensible intuition, Delcassé became the center of gravity for their
combination of energies.
He accepted their views, identified with them, made himself the
animator of them: the protagonist to the point of becoming, in the eyes of contemporaries and posterity, the promoter of this rejuvenated diplomacy
whose success went to exalt la patrie."28
Although Delcassé remained in office until 1905, the great achievements of French diplomacy in Italy were manifested by mid-1902. By the latter date, Barrère had worked with the Italians to eradicate the political, diplomatic, imperial and economic tensions which had alienated France and Italy since the 1880s. In the important notes he exchanged in June 1902 with the Italian foreign minister, Marquis Giulio Prinetti, Barrère attained the greatest possible assurance of Italy's neutrality toward France despite the continued Italian membership in the anti-French Triple Alliance. There were other diplomatic victories by Barrère after June 1902, but these were only supplementary to the entente realized in the Prinetti-Barrère Accord.
In assessing Delcassé’s role in the implementation of French foreign policy in Italy, it is also possible to conclude with the Prinetti-Barrère Accord. By the time these agreements were negotiated, the role of Delcassé as the critical overseer of ambassadorial initiatives is clearly illustrated. Because Barrère assumed great latitude in the exercise of his duties, Delcassé had, even before 1902, been relegated to a reactive role in his Italian politic.
Although Delcassé contributed helpful ideas to Barrère during critical periods of
negotiation, he did not make policy in Italy. He retarded lines of action, but he did not invent the overtures and networking that led to success in Rome. Instead, Delcassé concerned himself with parliamentary scrutiny of his foreign policy and the co-ordination of the activities of his skillful representatives abroad.
One question posed but not answered by the present study concerns the entire scope of Delcassian diplomacy. If, from an analysis of French policy in Italy, it is ascertained that the ambassador actually made policy, to what degree were other French representatives creating policy rather than implementing the decisions of Delcassé? The French ambassador to England, Paul Cambon, exercised a diplomatic talent comparable to that of Barrère. Was he on his own? Did he make policy and notify Paris to implement his policy suggestions? Is Paul Cambon rather than Delcassé to be credited with French diplomatic achievements in England?29
Paul's brother, Jules Cambon, was the French representative in Madrid during the negotiations over Morocco. Did he also exercise a free hand in conducting French diplomacy in Spain? Were France's international gains from the Spanish ultimately realized by Jules Cambon, needing only the approval of Delcasse to become official?30
In Russia how important were the roles played by the Marquis de Montebello until 1902, and by Maurice Bompard after that date? Were Delcassé's accomplishments in the Tsarist Empire the doing of his ambassadors?
Finally, since most sources admit that the Marquis de Noailles and Georges Bihourd were not effective ambassadors in Berlin during Delcassé’s tenure,31 to what extent is the lack of competent French representation in Germany responsible for the persistent state of estrangement in Franco-German relations? Only further research into French relations with these specific Powers can answer such queries.
Unlike the historical personage of Delcassé, Camille Barrère has failed to inspire great historical assessment. Although one diminutive biography exists, there is only one competent analysis of his activities in Rome. Most of the important historical material dealing with Barrère is confined to short mention in generalized discussions of French and Italian foreign affairs, and memoirs by men with whom he worked. Even so, writers dealing with Barrère were not in agreement.
Historiographical debate on his career falls into two positions: those who feel he was an evil genius luring France and Italy into undesirable political positions; and those who feel that, as an outstanding diplomatist, Barrère won for France the assurance of Italian friendship despite an intense Franco-German rivalry. The one point upon which both sides do agree is that Barrère exercised a dominant influence over French and Italian foreign policy throughout his residence at the Farnese Palace.
René Pinon, an anti-republican journalist, felt Barrère acted only out of a search for personal glory. He saw Barrère manipulating Italian radicalism, Jewry, and
Freemasonry as "the instruments he needed to make his policy a success, and to impose it upon France." As for his relationship with the foreign minister, Pinon believed that "Delcassé was seduced and act by act was drawn probably further than he had at first foreseen…he became the prisoner of the new policy."32
Italian historians hostile to Barrère have painted the ambassador's alleged immorality even more luridly. This group of writers, negatively assessing the value to Italy of the Franco-Italian entente, or concluding that the Italian declarations of neutrality in 1914 and of war in 1915 were betrayals of the Triple Alliance,33 considered Barrère as a devilish character who lured vulnerable Italian statesmen to infamy.
For Salvario Cilibrizzi, the French ambassador was "a man of quasi-Satanic ability" who accomplished his goals through "obscure actions."34 To Luigi Albertini, the renown journalist-politician-historian, Barrère was "the tempter" at the side of Giulio Prinetti. He argued that the Italian foreign minister, with "his outbursts, his rages, his wild utterances," was easy prey for the infernal Barrère. The ambassador, according to Albertini, "had acquired a considerable ascendancy over the Italian minister and took advantage of it at a favorable moments" to obtain Prinetti’s signature on the 1902 Accord promising the neutrality of Italy in case of a German war upon France.35
Another writer, Alberto Lumbroso, looked at Barrère’s diplomatic technique and concluded that he was a "man of intrigue” who was "pliant, unsympathetic, suspicious of everything, but he always returns to his goal. He has a terrible art; he knows how to spend well at the right time."36
The great historian, Francesco Tommasini, criticized Barrère for undermining "with shrewd audacity and without scruples" the contractual obligations of Italy within the Triple Alliance. Above all, he assailed the French ambassador for "destroying the moral force" which kept the Alliance viable.37
In contrast to those who envision Barrère as Satanic, another school of historians celebrates Barrère, From the writing of men like Leon Noël, Jules Laroche, and
Enrico Serra, the French ambassador emerges as the patriotic champion of French national interests and the epitome of diplomatic craftsmanship. Noël and Laroche, both of whom were ambassadors during the interwar period, wrote following World War II. They emphasized the patriotism of Barrère. In Noël's short biography, Barrère possessed the same nationalistic qualities now needed in the early years of the Fourth Republic: he was "one of those who, after the disasters of 1870 was able by patriotic will, foresight, resolution, and valor to assure for our country a new period of grandeur and glory."38
In the memoirs of Laroche, the ambassador again exhibited laudable patriotic qualities. Laroche, who had been Barrère's secretary at the Farnese Palace for fifteen years, remembered the ambassador as a "remarkable chief…a just and good chief whose personal and diplomatic aplomb was incessantly directed toward the task of liberating our Alpine frontier from the threat which the Triple Alliance was able to inflict upon it."39
Of the writers in both schools, however, only the Italian historian Enrico Serra assessed the ambassador with the analytical and documentary methodology of the diplomatic historian. Serra’s study of Barrère's twenty-six years in Rome was written in 1950, and in it he reached a conclusion shared with the diplomat Georges Saint-René Taillandier, that for Barrère "his country was his greatest love. But the ardor of that sentiment never altered in him the just sense of what was realizable and what was not. He was and will remain the model of French diplomacy."40
Since it is the only sophisticated study of Barrère, the Serra monograph has become the classical treatment of the ambassador's career. It is, nonetheless, not without
shortcomings. Serra was handicapped by gaps in the source material available. His study was based upon published French documents (In 1950, however, important volumes of the Documents diplomatics francais had not yet appeared.), unpublished materials from the private archives of two Italian families, and a compilation of the secondary materials then available. Serra lacked sufficient archival and published government documents to reconstruct adequately the full scope of Barrère’s activities in Rome. He also lacked the personal correspondence necessary to assess more completely the nature of the relationship between Barrère and his foreign minister.
My research has enabled me to present a much fuller account of Barrère’s ambassadorial career during the critical years, 1898-1902. Furthermore, in Paris in the
government archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I discovered political despatches written by Barrère during the period 1891-1894 which enabled me to discern his ideas on Franco-Italian relations, ideas which he would bring to fruition as French policy. I also discovered unpublished diplomatic documents that illuminate Barrère’s actions during his triumphs in Rome.
Finally, the Delcassé Papers in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris contained much personal and professional correspondence between Barrère and Delcassé which gave me a clearer picture of the unique relationship between these two friends who coincidentally became ambassador and foreign minister.
The Paris Archives of the Ministries of the Army and Navy contained unpublished reports and despatches which lent depth to those of the Quai d’Orsay. Because much of French concern with Italy involved that nation's military and naval strength, it was informative to discover the thinking on such matters of these two French ministries. Moreover, the intelligence reports of the Deuxième Bureau of the French General Staff provided interesting information on all facets of Franco-Italian relations. Written by military attachés and informed by French and Italian spies working in upper echelons of the bureaucracy in Rome, these reports were read in Paris by high-ranking officials that included the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
In Rome the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contained informative letters and reports from the Italian ambassador in Paris. Although these materials do not figure crucially in a study of Barrère’s diplomatic activities, they do point up the unimportant role played by Count Guiseppe Tornielli in the creation of the Franco-Italian entente. This insignificance, moreover, helps also to explain Barrère’s extraordinary importance in Rome.
Finally, I have made extensive use of diplomatic documents published after 1950. Italian and French government publications presented the most important communications and enabled me to add a narrative depth to this study of Barrère and Delcassé.
This is not a treatment of Barrère’s career at the Farnese Palace. Nor is it a study of his activities during Delcassé’s seven years term in office. Instead, it is a multifaceted analysis of four eventful years in French diplomatic history. And as such it deals with several major bilateral problems which, when resolved, altered the political balance of the European great powers.
This is also the study of an ambassador. At once suave and forceful, inventive and dedicated, Camille Barrère was a man of prepossessing personal tact and persuasion, able to move flexibly through resistance in Rome and in Paris to achieve the goals he fashioned for French foreign policy. In demonstrating his remarkable sway at the Farnese Palace, I have attempted to show how fully he embodied the characteristics of an excellent ambassador as described by the late Sir Harold Nicolson: truthfulness, precision, calm, patience, good-temperedness, modesty, and loyalty.41
This is also the study of a foreign minister. Here, I have challenged the traditionally laudatory view of Delcassé and suggested that the history of his policy needs reconsideration. Delcasse was a major player, but more so as the coordinator of semi-independent ambassadors of remarkable perception and energy. Delcasse held office for a long time, and that gave unusual continuity to French foreign policy. But he was still a bureaucrat, a parliamentary minister holding an important portfolio and worried about governmental changes and loss of office. He was not the creative spark, but he worked constructively with those who did spark that important diplomatic revolution that unfolded during his tenure.
In conducting French policy in Italy, Camille Barrère operated for the most part with a "free hand." Many times "not awaiting instructions in order to act,”42 he functioned with an independence which few foreign ministers, great and obscure, ever afforded to their representatives abroad.43 The result of such permissiveness was that during the Delcassian period, Barrère was able to navigate Italian statesmen and public opinion away from the strongly anti-French spirit of the Triple Alliance and into a position of economic and political entente with France.
Significantly, it was from this situation of diplomatic understanding that the Italians in 1915 joined the French in waging the Great War against their former allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Seen in this light, the Russian foreign minister, Serge Sazonov, was underestimating the importance of Barrère’s accomplishments when he remarked that French policy in Italy “drew the sting out of the Triple Alliance.”44 The following pages attempt to illustrate the manner in which Barrère, during the period 1898-1902, worked to establish an understanding between France and Italy which, more than draw the sting out of the Triple Alliance, fatefully undermined the Italian role in that formidable anti-French alignment.
In 1914 when the guns of August were being mobilized for war, France faced a formidable threat. The German plan for this occasion, the Schlieffen Plan, had been developed in 1905. It envisioned a quick strike through Belgium and into Northern France. General von Schieffen of the German General Staff hoped the Italians would contribute 200,000 troops to the anticipated struggle. He hoped, too, that a mobilized Italy would preoccupy sizable numbers of French units along the Alpine front in Southeastern France.
Although the Germans soon abandoned the idea of coordinating their troops with Italian military forces, the important matter here is that French generals felt confident enough to post relatively few military units along the Italian border. This was because of the achievements by Camille Barrère. And given the difficulty of the French victory at the Marne River in September 1914—a brutal battle which split the invading German armies and prevented the enemy from entering Paris and engulfing France—Barrère’s achievement twelve years earlier appears even more impressive.
ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION
¹ On the matter of a diplomatic revolution see Oron James Hale, Germany and the Diplomatic Revolution. A Study in Diplomacy and the Press, 1904-1906 (Philadelphia, 1931).
² Alfred Francis Pribram, England and the International Policy of the European Great Powers, 1871-1914. (London, 1931), p. 99
³ For a discussion of the weakened state of the Franco-Russian Alliance by 1898, see Pierre Renouvin, "Les engagements de l’alliance franco-russe" Revue d'histoire de la guerre mondiale. 1 February 1934, pp. 297-310.
4 John Francis Parr, Théophile Delcassé and the Practice of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1898-1905 (Moret-sur-Loing, 1952), pp. 157-161.
5 Christopher Andrew, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1968), pp. 279-301.
6 Kaiser Wilhelm’s annotation to Miquel to Bülow, 19 September 1906; GP, XXI, #8518.
8 Charles W, Porter, The Career of Théophile Delcassé (Philadelphia, 1936), p. 51.
9 George Peabody Gooch, Before the War. Studies in Diplomacy (London, 1936), I, pp. 182-183.
10 Comte de Saint-Aulaire, Confessions d’un vieux diplomate (Paris, 1953).
11 This thesis is maintained by Porter, op . cit., p. 165; Saint-Aulaire, op. cit., p. 54; Sir Sidney Lee, King Edward VII: A Biography (London, 1927), II, p. 216.
12 This interpretation is maintained by Alberic Neton, Delcassé, 1852-1923 (Paris, 1952), p. 215; Rene Pinon , France et Allemagne, 1870-1913 (Paris, 1913), pp. 140-143; Eugene N. Anderson, The First Moroccan Crisis, 1904-1906 (Chicago, 1930), p. 10; Un Diplomate [Henri Cambon] , Paul Cambon, Ambassadeur de France (1843-1924) (Paris, 1937), p. 204; Jean-Marie Le Breton, "De Tanger à Algeciras. 31 mars 1905-7 avril 1906," Revue litterature, histoire, arts et sciences des deux mondes, 1 October 1967, p. 367.
1 This thesis is maintained by Pierre Renouvin, La politique exterièure de Théophile Delcassé (Paris, 1962), p. 7; Frederick L. Schuman, War and Diplomacy in the French Republic (New York, 1931), p. 161.
13 This is the interpretation of Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (London, 1952), I, p. 132, and Venti anni di vita politica (Bologna, 1950), I, p. 82; Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaurès (Madison, 1962), p. 244, 294; Maurice Bompard, Mon ambassade en Russie 1903-1908 (Paris, 1937), p. iii; Raymond Recouly, De Bismarck à Poincaré. Soixante ans de diplomatie républicaine (Paris, 1932), p. 146.
14 Andrew, op. cit., p. 305.
15 Barrère to Delcassé, 19 December 1901; MAE, Delcassé MSS, I.
16 Henri de Blowitz, "French Diplomacy under the Third Republic," New York, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine, June 1894, p. 65.
17 Camille Barrère, "Frederick Lemaitre," Gentleman’s Magazine, London, August 1974, pp. 447-459; “Victor Hugo’s Dramas,” London, Macmillan’s Magazine, August 1874.
18 Frederick Cunliffe-Owen, "France’s To Chief Envoys at Genoa," New York Times, April 9, 1922.
19 On Barrère as a musician see, Jules Alfred Laroche, Quinze ans à Rome avec Camille Barrère (1898-1913), (Paris, 1948), p 12. The Poirson instrument was inscribed: "Made for Mr. Camille Barrère Ambassador from France No. 152 Lyon Year 1897." The book is W. Henry Hill, Antoine Stradvarius: son vie et son œuvre. London, 1907.
20 Cunliffe-Owen, op. cit.
21 Camille Barrère, "La chute de Delcassé," Revue des deux mondes, 1 August 1932, pp, 607-609; Salvario Cilibrizzi, Storia parlamentare politica e diplomatica d’Italia da Novara a Vittorio Veneto (Naples, 1939-1948), III, p. 206.
22 Laroche, op. cit., p 11.
23 According to Christopher Andrew, Delcassé was actually "the candidate of the parti colonial" when he attained power in 1898; see Andrew, op. cit., p. 53.
24 Cambon to his son, 24 December 1901, in Paul Cambon, Correspondance 1870-1924 (Paris, 1940-1946), II, pp. 64-65. Cambon at one point actually gave up hope of ever seeing a strong foreign minister. Instead, he began to expect the stabilizing strength to come from the Presidency of the Republic. See Louis Le Gall, "Opinions de Paul Cambon sur le rôle, en politique étrangère de quelques Ministres, et des divers Présidents de la République," Revue d'historie diplomatique. July-September 1954, pp. 202-207.
25 Delcassé' remained in office for eighty-four consecutive months. On this matter see Jacques Ollé-Laprune, La stabilité des ministères sous la troisième république, 1879-1940 (Paris, 1962), pp. 304-370
26 Charles de Chambrun, L’esprit de la diplomatie (Paris, 1944), p. 42.
27 Quoted in Le Temps, 3 May 1926; MC, Biographie Contemporaine , file 15844.
28 Chambrun, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
29 On the role of Paul Cambon in forging the entente cordiale, see Keith Eubank, Paul Cambon, Master Diplomatist (Norman, Oklahoma, 1960), pp. 61-89. According to one French writer, Cambon actually conceived of the policy leading to rapprochement in the 1890s while he was ambassador to the Ottoman Empire; see Francois Charles-Roux, Trois ambassades francaises à la veille de la guerre (Paris, 1928), p. 111, and his later publication Souvenirs diplomatiques d’un âge révolu (Paris, 1956), pp. 239-241.
30 According to one author, during his tenure in Washington, D.C. Jules Cambon operated with a “free hand” in efforts to settle the Spanish-American War in 1898-1899; see Andrew, op. cit., p. 79.
31 On the actions of Noailles, see Chambrun, op. cit., pp. 35-36; on Bihourd’s ineptitude, see Laroche, op. cit., pp. 125-127.
32 Rene Pinon, L’empire de la Méditerranée (Paris, 1904), pp. 79-80.
33 Enrico Serra, Camille Barrère e l‘intesa italo-francese (Milan, 1950), p. 143n.
34 Cilibrizzi, op. cit., p. 205.
35 Albertini, Origins of the War, p. 127; cf. his Venti anni di vita politica, p. 81.
36 Alberto Lumbroso, as quoted in Cilibrizzi, op. cit., p. 206.
37 Francesco Tommasini, L’Italia alia vigilia della guerra. La politica estera di Tommaso Tittoni (Bologna, 1934-1941), I, pp. 105-107.
38 Leon Noël, Camille Barrère, Ambassadeur de France (Bourges, 1948), p. 106.
39 Laroche, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
40 Serra, op. cit., p. 377; compare Noël, op. cit., p. 17
41 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3rd ed. (London, 1963), pp. 104-126.
42 Camille Barrère, "Lettres à Delcassé," Revue de Paris, 15 April 1937, p. 721.
43 An interesting discussion of this relationship is in Action Française, 17 April 1937, MC, Biographie Contemporaine, file 15017.
44 Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years, 1909-1916 (New York, 1928), p. 23.
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